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Agenda-setting dynamics during the campaign period 
1 Introduction 
Previous research has often considered the media to serve as a powerful agenda-setter during 
election campaigns shaping voters’ perceptions of the decision-making context in fundamen-
tal ways (Cohen 1963; Funkhouser 1973; McCombs, Shaw 1972; Weaver et al. 1981). The 
mass media not only reach a vast share of the electorate, they often are even so omnipresent in 
daily life that voters hardly can escape from exposure to the most salient mass media messag-
es (McCombs 2012). Evidence of the mass media’s agenda-setting capacity has accumulated 
over decades (Dearing, Rogers 1996; Eichhorn 1996; Maurer 2010; McCombs 2014) showing 
that high levels of news media coverage focussing on an issue are associated with high levels 
of the public concern, which, in turn, may have an impact on election results (Budge, Farlie 
1983; Petrocik 1996). Taken to extremes, this influence of the media in defining public priori-
ties implies that in particular in close races the media may play a pivotal role by directing the 
marginal vote in one rather than the other direction. 
Other research, however, suggests that the media’s influence is narrowly limited due to a 
number of factors (Dalton et al. 1998; Walgrave, van Aelst 2006; Walgrave, Soroka, and 
Nuytemans 2008). One such limiting factor is voters’ memory. Previous studies have demon-
strated that agenda-setting effects may often be very short-lived (Atwater, Salwen, and 
Anderson 1985; Gehrau 2014; Iyengar, Kinder 1987: 24-26; Selb 2003; Watt, Mazza, and 
Snyder 1993). This implies that coverage may only have an impact on the vote when shifts in 
the media’s agenda occur shortly before election day. 
A second limiting factor of the mass media’s influence of the media’s agenda-setting power 
are the political actors who aim to influence the public agenda during election campaigns. 
During the campaign period, the political parties increase their advertising efforts and try to 
manipulate the issue salience among the public by emphasizing favourable issues (Petrocik 
1996; Simon 2002). As a consequence, rather than being “‘blown about’ by the political 
winds of the times” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954: 139), voters during campaigns 
may face rather familiar symbolic issues that are suitable to activate latent supporters 
(Petrocik 1996; Walgrave, van Aelst 2006). Thus, voters may learn about the most important 
issues rather from the campaigns run by the parties than from the media. 
Finally, a third limiting factor is the structure of the media system. The notion of one common 
agenda appears less convincing the more “media institutions are changing such that mass pro-
 2 
duction is less mass“ (Chaffee, Metzger 2001: 369). Specifically, previous research has ar-
gued that the rise of new media and the increasing fragmentation of the audience may render 
agenda-setting effects “less sweeping” (Iyengar, Kinder 2010: 144) as countervailing effects 
in different sub-audiences may cancel each other out and the chances to escape from politics 
altogether grow (Prior 2007). Thus, given the rise in fragmentation of campaign audiences, 
agenda-setting effects might increasingly be confined to subgroups of the voter population. 
Taking into account evidence in favour of the mass media’s agenda-setting power as well as 
the limiting factors, a number of specific research questions about agenda-setting dynamics 
during the campaign period arise: (1) Do higher levels of issue coverage lead to an increase in 
public concern about the issue? (2) How long-lasting are such agenda-setting effects? (3) Can 
the parties effectively bypass the media through advertising and directly influence public con-
cern about issues? (4) How fragmented is the agenda-setting process, i.e., to what extent are 
agenda-setting effects limited to specific news audiences? By addressing these questions, the 
study aims to provide an enhanced understanding of how the information flow during election 
campaigns affects the formation the public’s priorities at elections. 
To examine these research questions, the study focusses on the 2009 and the 2013 German 
federal election campaigns. The German campaign information environment is marked by 
strong legal restrictions on campaign advertisement (Kaid, Holtz-Bacha 2006) and an increas-
ing proliferation of information sources (Schulz 2005). Over past decades, private broadcast-
ers and online media have emerged supplementing, but possibly also substituting the tradi-
tionally dominant mass media such as public-service television and newspapers. So far, how-
ever, it is not clear whether parties are able to bypass the media and shape the public agenda 
directly given the restrictions on advertising and how the increasing media fragmentation 
might affect the agenda-setting process. Apart from this general background, the two cam-
paigns were very similar with regard to election-specific features such as the length of the 
campaign, campaign spending (Krewel, Schmitt-Beck, and Wolsing 2011; Krewel 2014; 
Tenscher 2012), the nature of party competition, the features of the chancellor candidates 
candidates (Rosar, Hoffmann 2015), and the long-term issue agenda (Giebler, Aiko 2015: 14). 
Therefore, the campaigns allow for an assessment of the mass media’s agenda-setting power 
that is typical for contemporary German federal elections. 
The study combines voter survey data with contextual data about the media news coverage 
and campaign advertisements. Specifically, the voter survey data comes from two rolling-
cross-section studies (Rattinger et al. 2013; Rattinger et al. 2014) that were conducted as part 
of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) during the run-up to the 2009 and the 
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2013 election. The content analyses data cover a broad range of different news sources, in-
cluding public-service and private television news, national quality newspapers, the most im-
portant national tabloid as well as local newspapers and online news. Content analyses of the 
main evening television news (Rattinger et al. 2015a; Rattinger et al. 2015b) and the national 
newspapers (Rattinger et al. 2012; Rattinger et al. 2015c) were conducted by human-coding 
as part of the GLES project. Using a dictionary-based computerized coding, in addition, the 
content of local newspapers and online news was coded by the author to capture further as-
pects of the increasingly complex news environment. Furthermore, the campaign posters and 
TV spots by the political parties were coded manually by the author to evaluate the impact of 
campaign advertisement on the public agenda. 
The chapter is structured as follows: First, the agenda-setting process is conceptualized as an 
interaction between voters’ cognitive foundations and the structure of the campaign infor-
mation environment and a set of testable hypotheses is derived based on previous research. 
Then, the German campaign information environment and the German federal campaigns are 
described. Next, information about the data and methods used to test the hypotheses are pro-
vided. After visually exploring the dynamics of the public agenda during the two election 
campaigns, the hypotheses are assessed. Finally, I summarize the key findings of the study 
and discuss the mass media’s agenda-setting power and the role of limiting factors in the con-
text of the German election campaigns. 
 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
Agenda-setting can be thought of as an interaction between voters’ psychology and the cam-
paign information environment. For this reason, two theoretical aspects need to be addressed 
to derive hypotheses about the agenda-setting dynamics during the campaign period: the un-
derlying cognitive mechanisms behind agenda-setting effects on the one hand and the struc-
ture of the campaign information environment on the other. To learn about the cognitive 
foundations of agenda-setting is crucial to form expectations about how agenda-setting effects 
arise and how long they may last. In addition, the structure of the campaign information envi-
ronment is important as the fragmentation of the media system may render agenda-setting 
effects ineffective and as it determines the chances of the political parties to bypass the me-
dia’s logic and to serve as an agenda-setter instead. 
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2.1 Cognitive foundations of agenda-setting effects 
While earlier agenda-setting research has been rather agnostic about theorizing the cognitive 
mechanisms, recent research has shown an heightened interest in the psychological founda-
tions of agenda-setting effects (Bulkow, Urban, and Schweiger 2013; McCombs, Stroud 
2014; Pingree, Stoycheff 2013; Takeshita 2006). Most notably, this research has established 
the distinction between two different types of agenda-setting by reinterpreting earlier research 
in the light of broader theories about information-processing (Eagly, Chaiken 1993; Petty, 
Cacioppo 1986). The two types of agenda-setting effects I will refer to as agenda-cueing and 
agenda-reasoning (McCombs, Stroud 2014; Pingree, Stoycheff 2013) in the following. 
The first type, agenda-cueing, is thought to be the result of a peripheral mode of information-
processing (Bulkow, Urban, and Schweiger 2013; McCombs, Stroud 2014). Peripheral pro-
cessing involves that voters—instead of closely examining the message’s content—draw in-
ferences about the importance of issues based on presentation cues such as the lead position 
or the volume of coverage (Iyengar, Kinder 1987) or heuristics such as the accessibility of 
considerations (Iyengar 1990). Drawing these types of inferences typically does not require 
much cognitive effort. Due to the rather superficial and effortless mode of processing, howev-
er, agenda-cueing effects are rather short-lived and rapidly decay over time as the information 
does not get well integrated into voters’ memory and quickly vanishes from the voters’ mind. 
Agenda-reasoning, in contrast, involves more deliberative and systematic processing of the 
message content (Bulkow, Urban, and Schweiger 2013; McCombs, Stroud 2014). Agenda-
reasoning implies that voters thoughtfully learn from the media about the importance current 
political issues (Rössler 1999: 17-18). For this purpose, importance is judged on the basis of 
arguments about the relevance of issues rather than on the grounds of the mere frequency and 
recency of message exposure. This means, for instance, that highly prominent news reports 
which carry the message that a specific problem is not very relevant any longer should de-
crease rather than increase in public concern. This phenomenon has also become known as 
agenda-deflating (Schönbach, Semetko 1992). As agenda-reasoning requires that the message 
content is processed thoroughly, more cognitive effort is needed. Therefore this type agenda-
setting may be less common or confined only to highly involved and sophisticated voters 
(Bulkow, Urban, and Schweiger 2013; Miller, Krosnick 2000). At the same time, however, 
given the more deliberative and more effortful mode of processing, agenda-reasoning may 
produce longer lasting effects as the learned information becomes more thoroughly stored in 
memory. 
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Judging from the empirical findings of existing observational studies, it seems that short-term 
agenda-cueing effects are predominant. For instance, according to Selb (2003), who studied 
agenda-setting in the context of the 1999 electoral campaign in the canton of Zurich, effects 
of coverage on issue salience decay quickly within a couple of days and after that turn out to 
be no longer significant. In line with this finding, Gehrau and colleagues (2014) studying 
agenda-setting effects in the German context over a much longer time frame find as well ef-
fects that are for most part limited to the week of exposure. Thus, based on these findings 
from previous research, it seems reasonable to expect that agenda-cueing is the main mecha-
nism behind agenda-setting effects. As agenda-cueing depends on the recency of exposure, 
rather than the message content, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more recently voters have become exposed to news coverage about an is-
sue, the more the public concern about an issue rises. 
 
This hypothesis implies that the more agenda-setting effects will decay over time as infor-
mation evades form voters’ memory. As a consequence, only information that is provided 
shortly before the election is likely to affect voters’ final decision.  
 
2.2 The structure of the campaign information environment 
An implicit underlying assumption of classical agenda-setting theory is that there is essential-
ly one national agenda and that this agenda is constructed and defined by the mass media 
(McCombs 2014). This notion is supported by general findings: First, journalists of different 
news organization have been found to share common professional norms and selection criteria 
which increase the consistency across outlets (Weischenberg, Malik, and Scholl 2006a,2006b; 
Willnat, Weaver 2014). Second, consistency is further enhanced through processes of inter-
media agenda-setting where highly renowned news organizations, such as the New York 
Times, for instance, set the agenda for other media (Golan 2006; Lopez-Escobar, Llamas, and 
McCombs 1998). And, in fact, previous research has found that there often is a common na-
tional mass media agenda across different outlets, even in national contexts with a language 
divide that may appear particularly prone to agenda fragmentation (Soroka 2002: ch. 3). 
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Figure 1: A model of the mediated agenda in a complex information environment 
 
 
However, the information environment during election campaigns may be more complex than 
basic agenda-setting theory suggests (Dalton et al. 1998). Most notably, the assumption of one 
national agenda ignores any influence of the the competing parties trying to spread their own 
agenda in order to maximize votes (Petrocik 1996; Simon 2002; Vavreck 2009) as well as the 
increasing fragmentation of the media system and the audience (Bennett, Iyengar 2008; 
Iyengar, Kinder 2010: Epilogue; Prior 2007). To incorporate these arguments, Figure 1 pre-
sents a more complex model of the campaign information environment that takes into account 
the direct channels of party communication as well as the fragmentation of the media land-
scape that may lead to the segmentation of the public into several sub-audiences. 
As shown in Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. on the left hand side, 
each of the competing parties (which may vary in size and thus campaign resources) pursues 
its own political agenda, which may overlap to some extent with that of other parties such as 
potential coalition partners or parties from the same ideological camp. The political agenda, 
for instance, as formulated in the party manifesto, becomes translated into an agenda that is 
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mediated through direct channels of party communications (e.g. televised advertisements) 
over that the parties exert direct control (solid grey arrows). 1 The parties may strategically 
choose which elements of their political agenda, they put up front in their campaigns in order 
to maximize votes (Simon 2002). Most notably, previous research has found that parties tend 
to focus on rather long-standing symbolic issues that are suitable to activate latent partisans 
(Petrocik 1996; Walgrave, van Aelst 2006). When voters that become exposed to the parties’ 
mediated agenda, they may draw inferences from the campaign advertisement about the im-
portance of political issues, similar as from the media coverage. Stated as a hypothesis, it fol-
lows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more voters are exposed to political issues emphasized by the political par-
ties in their campaign advertisement, the more they become concerned about the 
issue. 
 
With regard to media fragmentation, previous research argued that the ever-growing complex-
ity of the media system and the proliferation new information sources may increasingly un-
dermine the credibility of the assumption of one common agenda and instead is likely to in-
creasingly lead to divergent agendas among the public (Bennett, Iyengar 2008; Iyengar, 
Kinder 2010; Prior 2007). Not only has the expansion of entertainment-oriented programs and 
formats following the rise of private broadcasting and cable television has allowed many vot-
ers to increasingly opt out of exposure to political content altogether (Prior 2007). Also, the 
rise of opinionated niche news (Iyengar, Hahn 2009; Stroud 2011) and in particular online 
media that allow for high selectivity suggests that at least some of the new outlets may signif-
icantly diverge with respect to content allowing different audiences to choose information 
based on their personal interests and priorities. Similarly, as opting out of political infor-
mation, this self-selection into political issues, is likely to rather reinforce pre-existing priori-
ties rather than changing them. Based on these arguments, the following hypothesis can be 
derived: 
 
                                                
1 The parties may as well reach out to the voters indirectly by influencing the mass media coverage (dashed grey 
arrows). However, in this case the party agenda is filtered through the selection criteria by the mass media like 
other incoming information (e.g. from real-world conditions and events). As the parties do not exert direct con-
trol over the reporting, this conforms with the assumption of one national agenda constructed by the media. As 
voters may often be unable to assess from whom the media messages initially originated, the indirect influence 
of the parties through the mass media is here attributed to the mass media rather than to the parties. 
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Hypothesis 3: Voters exposed to the more traditional mass media (e.g. public television and 
local newspapers) are more prone to agenda-setting effects than voters who are 
exposed to entertainment-oriented information sources (e.g. private television and 
tabloids) or rather opinionated sources that allow for high selectivity (e.g. quality 
press and online media). 
 
This hypothesis implies that to the extent that voters choose entertainment-oriented or highly 
selective information sources over the traditional mass media, the more likely voters are to 
vote based on divergent issue agendas. 
 
2.3 Summarizing expectations 
Overall based on previous research the expectation for the analyses is that the media can raise 
public concern about political issues, but that the media’s influence is limited by a number of 
factors. These factors include on the one hand voters’ memory, on the other hand they also 
include the campaign efforts by the political parties and the structure of the media system. 
According to the agenda-cueing hypothesis, agenda-setting effects are expected to dissipate 
rather quickly, so that shifts in the media agenda might only be influential late in the cam-
paign. The hypothesis about the role of the parties suggests that parties may eventually be 
successful to bypass the media and to reach out to voters directly. Finally, according to the 
media fragmentation hypothesis, not all media are equally likely to set the agenda as some 
media may be more strictly entertainment-oriented, featuring only little political content, or 
may encourage voters to select in based on their pre-existing issue priorities. The analyses 
will assess to what extent and which of these these limiting factors are present and relevant in 
the context of the 2009 and the 2013 German federal election campaigns. 
 
3 The campaign information environment of the 2009 and 2013 German federal 
elections 
The German campaign information environment is marked by strong legal restrictions on 
campaign advertisement (Holtz-Bacha, Kaid 2006) and an increasing proliferation of infor-
mation sources (Schulz 2005). Legal regulations of advertisement pertain to the (1) official 
campaign period, (2) the volume of advertising and (3) its content. Specifically, campaign 
posters are allowed only during the last two months and televised ads can be aired only during 
the last four weeks before the election. In contrast to the high volume of televised advertising 
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in the US presidential campaigns, the overall amount of advertising is rather low, despite the 
fact that the parties are allocated a certain amount of free air time on the public television 
channels. Finally, restrictions on the content of advertisement ban the incitement of hatred 
against a segment of the population such as a particular race or religion so that the of adver-
tisement in general tends to be mostly positive or neutral. Overall, the quite strong legal re-
strictions on advertisement raise the question whether parties are nevertheless able to shape 
the public agenda within environment. 
With regard to the media system, it seems important to point out that the German media sys-
tem in general has been classified as a ‘democratic corporatist media system’ (Hallin, Mancini 
2004) that is marked by a high circulation of local and local newspapers and strong public 
broadcasting. Over past decades, however, the German media system has become more frag-
mented as information sources have been proliferating (Schulz 2005: 57): In particular, legal 
deregulations since the mid-1980s have facilitated the rise of private television, leading to a 
strong increase in the number of available television channels and ending the previous domi-
nance of public-service broadcasters. Likewise, the rise of online media has added further 
options for voters to choose from when becoming informed about politics and elections. Thus, 
overall–although traditional mass media may still play an very important role–the German 
media system has become increasingly complex, which raises the question of how agenda-
setting processes play out under these circumstances. 
In addition to this general background, the 2009 and the 2013 German federal election cam-
paigns were also very similar with regard to many other aspects. Both elections were regular 
elections that were held after the end of the four-year legislation period which left the parties 
sufficient time to prepare their campaign strategy. Campaign spending was broadly the same 
in both campaigns (Krewel, Schmitt-Beck, and Wolsing 2011; Krewel 2014; Tenscher 2012), 
so that the influence of the parties to shape the agenda should not be affected by this. The 
nature of party competition was very similar as voters held very similar expectations about the 
election outcome (Krewel, Schmitt-Beck, and Wolsing 2011; Partheymüller 2014) and the 
pair of chancellor candidates was comparable (Rosar, Hoffmann 2015). With regard to the 
long-term issue agenda, the campaigns differed only slightly: The 2009 election came about 
within the mid of the global economic and financial crisis that had spread since the burst of 
the U.S. housing bubble in 2007, whereas the 2013 campaign took place in the aftermath the 
European debt crisis (Giebler, Aiko 2015: 14). Therefore, in both instances the campaign 
agenda was somewhat overshadowed by long- or medium-term trends in the public agenda 
that constrain the the media’s and parties’ capacity to influence the agenda during the cam-
 10 
paign period (Schönbach, Semetko 1992). For these reasons the cases of the 2009 and 2013 
campaigns can be considered as typical instances of contemporary German federal election 
campaigns that allow for a rather conservative assessment of the stated hypotheses due to the 
agenda constraints enforced by long-term trends. 
 
4 Data and methods 
To test the hypotheses at these two elections, this study makes use of voter survey data and 
combines it with contextual data about the media content and the party campaigns. Specifical-
ly, the study relies on voter survey data from two telephone surveys (Rattinger et al. 2013; 
Rattinger et al. 2014) that were conducted in accordance with the rules of the rolling cross-
section design (Johnston, Brady 2002; Kenski, Gottfried, and Jamieson 2011). On each day of 
the campaign a randomly selected sample of about 100 respondents was interviewed, so that 
dynamics of the public agenda can be tracked continuously throughout the campaign. The two 
surveys differed slightly in the number of days covered before the election (for details, see 
Partheymüller, Schmitt-Beck, and Hoops 2013; Schmitt-Beck, Faas, and Wolsing 2010). To 
enhance comparability between the data sets, the analysis here confines itself to the last 55 
days before election day in both years. Both surveys asked respondents for up to two most 
important problems in Germany. The open-ended responses were coded manually according 
to a hierarchical coding scheme covering a comprehensive set of policy areas. 
The contextual data contain information about the issue agenda of television news, national 
and local newspapers, online news as well as about the agenda of the parties’ television adver-
tisements and campaign posters. As part of the GLES project, television news stories of the 
two major public service channels (ARD, ZDF) and the two major private channels (RTL, 
Sat.1) as well as newspaper articles of five quality newspapers (Welt, FAZ, SZ, FR, taz) and 
the highest-circulation tabloid (Bild) were coded by human coders using a coding scheme 
mirroring the categories of the scheme used for the coding of the open-ended mentions from 
the voters survey (Rattinger et al. 2012; Rattinger et al. 2015c; Rattinger et al. 2015a; 
Rattinger et al. 2015b). In addition to these data, newspaper articles of nine local newspapers 
from a broad range of regions (Berliner Kurier, Berliner Morgenpost, Berliner Zeitung, Gen-
eral-Anzeiger Bonn, Hamburger Abendblatt, Kölner Express, Nürnberger Nachrichten, 
Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Stuttgarter Zeitung) as well as online news from one of the most fre-
quented political news websites (Spiegel online) were retrieved from the LexisNexis database 
and automatically coded using a dictionary (Grimmer, Stewart 2013) that was constructed by 
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the author to match with the categories of the other media material. Finally, the content of the 
parties’ television advertisements and campaign posters was manually coded by the author, 
again with matching issue categories. Taking advantage of the hierarchical structure of the 
detailed coding scheme and taking into account the empirical distributions of problem men-
tions as well as of media issue content, 18 relevant issue areas were identified and the catego-
ries were recoded accordingly. 
To test the hypotheses, I make use of a semiparametric multilevel model (SPMM) suitable for 
a longitudinal analysis and taking into account both the individual-level and and the aggre-
gate-level (Fahrmeir, Kneib 2011; Lin, Zhang 1999; Ruppert, Wand, and Carroll 2003). By 
adopting a multi-level model, the study moves beyond the the distinction of micro- versus 
macro-level analysis as commonly drawn, for instance, in the Acapulco typology by 
McCombs (2014: ch. 2). The advantage of such a multilevel model is that it allows to include 
both stable individual-level covariates, aggregate-level covariates that change over time, as 
well as interactions between the two levels. 
As a further methodological novelty to agenda-setting research, I include flexible distributed 
lags (Obermeier et al. 2015; Wood 2011) in the model that allow estimate the decay function 
of the agenda-setting effects in a semiparametric way. This approach has so far not been used 
in political science applications, however, has been successfully used to study the dynamic 
impact of in the context of geophysics (Obermeier et al. 2015). The main advantage of this 
approach over parametric approaches previously pursued is that the semiparametric estima-
tion of the decay function avoids to make arbitrary assumptions about the functional form of 
memory decay processes (Rubin, Wenzel 1996; Rubin, Hinton, and Wenzel 1999). 
The dependent variable in each model is the voters’ perceptions of the most important prob-
lems. Specifically, based on the first and second mentioned problem, for each of the 18 issues 
a dummy variable is generated indicating whether the issue was mentioned (1) or was not 
mentioned (0) by the respondent. Some respondents did not mention any policy-related issues, 
but rather referred to political processes (“the campaign”) or features of political system (“the 
parties”). These respondents take the value zero on all policy dummies and thus are included 
each time in the reference category. Respondents answering “don’t know” or who refused to 
answer at are treated as missing data and are omitted from the analysis.2  
                                                
2 Arguably, respondents who don’t know could be included in the reference category but here they cannot 
be perfectly separated from the refusals due to the open-ended question format where blanks could mean 
either of the two. 
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To assess the media’s agenda-setting power (Hypothesis 1 and 3), the media data are linked to 
the voter survey through a combination of the news exposure measures available in the voter 
survey, the date of interview, and lagged variables of the news content. Specifically, for each 
issue a matrix containing the likely exposure history over the past 28 days of the respondents 
is constructed. Findings from previous research indicate that a maximum time lag of 28 days 
should suffice to capture and compare agenda-effects across different daily news media out-
lets as agenda-setting effects have even been found to occur and decay even within a much 
shorter time frame (Wanta, Hu 1994). Likely exposure on each of the 28 days before the in-
terview is calculated by multiplying the relative frequency of exposure (number of days per 
week / 7) to a given news source with the number of news items from that source making ref-
erence to a given issue. For television news and national newspapers, in addition to the week-
ly exposure measure, additional information is available about the use on the day immediately 
before the interview (1 “yes”, 0” “no”). In order to capture exposure as precisely as possible, 
this indicator is used for these sources to determine the likely amount of exposure at Lag 1.  
Exposure and content of television news and national newspapers can be exactly matched at 
the level of the media outlet. For local newspapers the media content is averaged across the 
available sources, to generate a proxy measure of the local newspaper agenda. Similarly, the 
measure of the online news agenda based on one highly visible source provides an approxi-
mation of the overall online agenda. Thus, overall, as common in many observational studies 
that account for the individual-level (Beck et al. 2002; Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998; 
Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller 1980; Rössler 1999; Schuck, Vliegenthart, and De Vreese 
2016a,2016b; Selb 2003; Wolling 2002), an probabilistic approach to combine media content 
and exposure measures is pursued to capture the voters’ exposure history. 
Similarly, to test for the influence of party advertisement (Hypothesis 2), the content analysis 
data of party advertisement is linked to the voter survey through the measure of reported ex-
posure to advertising. In this case, the parties’ television advertisement and the campaign 
posters serve as a proxy for the parties’ issue emphasis. The emphasis on an issue is deter-
mined by whether the party mentioned an issue not at all (0), in one of the two forms of ad-
vertisement (1), or in both (2). The relative emphasis on an issue by a party (number of men-
tions / 2) was then multiplied with a party-specific indicator from the voter survey indicating 
whether the respondent had been exposed to advertisement of that party and summed up 
across all parties to determine likely exposure to the parties’ agenda. The exposure measure 
in this case captured only whether voters had already been exposed to the parties’ campaign 
communication (1 “yes”, 0” “no”) during the ongoing campaign (not when). For this reason, 
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no lags for past exposure can be included as this measure is not suitable to interpolate back-
wards. Still, the measure allows to assess the overall net impact of campaign advertisement. 
As the question of exposure to advertisement was only asked during the last four weeks be-
fore the election as legal constraints, the exposure measures for respondents interviewed be-
fore that date are set to zero and a dummy variable (1 “not asked”, 0 “asked”) is included to 
account for the missing data (Allison 2010). 
A number of control variables is included alongside these measures. In particular, following a 
suggestion by Fazekas and Larsen (2016) the media exposure measures (not combined with 
the content measures) are included in addition to the combined content-based measures as this 
allows to evaluate whether some audience are generally more inclined to specific issues re-
gardless of recent exposure to content. The media exposure measures capture the number of 
days in a week an outlet has been used (0 to 7 days; rescaled to zero-to-one range). Further 
controls include the frequency of personal political discussions (0 to 7 days; rescaled to zero-
to-one range), political interest (0 “not at all” to 4 “very strong”; rescaled to zero-to-one 
range), school education (1 “12 years of school or more” 0 “less than 12 years”), party identi-
fication (1 “CDUC/SU”, 2 “SPD”, 3 “Greens”, 4 “Left”, 5 “Other party”, 6 “No party identi-
fication”), social class (1 “Worker”, 2 “New middle class”, 3 “Old middle class”, 4 “Never 
gainfully employed”), union membership (1 “Yes, self or hold member”, 0 “No”), religious 
affiliation (1 “Catholic”, 2 “Protestant”, 3 “Other/None”), church attendance (1 “Never” to 4 
“Once a week or more”; rescaled to zero-to-one range), age (18-39 years, 40-64 years, 65 
years and older), gender (1 “male”, 0 “female”) and region (1 “New states”, 0 “Old states”). 
Besides these controls at the individual level (level 1), a smooth time trend is included at the 
aggregate level (level 2) to account for unobserved dynamic factors and possible autocorrela-
tion across adjacent days (Fahrmeir, Kneib 2011; Lebo, Weber 2015). At the same time, a 
random component is included capturing the non-smooth variance across the days of the elec-
tion campaign and accounting for the fact that the individual observations are nested within 
the day of interview. 
The analysis proceeds in three steps: In the first step, the dynamics in the public agenda are 
visually explored using smoothing techniques that allow to identify issues that show signifi-
cant over-time variation.3 In the second step, focussing on those issues with significant tem-
                                                
3 As the size of the daily rolling cross-section samples is relatively small, it is recommended to apply smoothing 
techniques to the data to separate the signal from random sampling error (Brady, Johnston 2006). For this pur-
pose the share of respondents was smoothed by a penalized cubic regression spline (Hastie, Tibshirani 1990; 
Wood 2006,2015) with automatic smoothness selection (Keele 2008; Wood 2011). To quantify the uncertainty 
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poral change, the dynamics are modelled as a function of the exposure to media content (Hy-
pothesis 1) and campaign advertisement (Hypothesis 2). This analysis allows to estimate the 
impact the media and the parties on the public agenda as well as to estimate the decay of the 
media agenda-setting effects. In the final step, for those issues that show significant media 
agenda-setting effects, the measure of exposure to media content is then differentiated by the 
type of the outlet. This, finally, allows to assess whether some media are more effective agen-
da-setters than others (Hypothesis 3). 
 
5 The dynamics of the public agenda 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. shows the dynamics of the public 
agenda in the German federal elections 2009 and 2013.4 One of the most striking features is 
the high levels of importance of economic and employment issues. In particular, in 2009, fac-
ing the global economic and financial crisis that hit the German economy in that year 
(Anderson, Hecht 2012), the concern about and employment and the economy dominated the 
public agenda (see left panel in Figure 2). The concern about the employment situation essen-
tially remained at the same level throughout the campaign and the concern about the economy 
at decreased only slightly during the campaign. In 2013, the concern about employment and 
the economy was overall lower than in the previous election, but due to the Eurozone crisis 
concern about the stability of the Euro and related European issues had surged (Giebler, Aiko 
2015). During the campaign the concern about the economy and employment decreased even 
slightly further whereas the concern about European issues remained at the same level. Thus, 
overall the evidence suggests that the long-term issue agenda clearly shaped and constrained 
the campaign agenda in both elections (Schönbach, Semetko 1992). 
However, apart from this, a number of significant short-term dynamics can be seen in Figure 
2. For instance, in 2009 there was a steep and sudden rise in concern about defence about 
three weeks before election day. This sudden significant rise is likely to be related to the news 
that broke about the bombing of two fuel transporters in Afghanistan that had been ordered by 
the German armed forces and caused the death of many civilians (Pötzschke, Schoen, and 
                                                                                                                                                   
of the spline fit, 95% confidence intervals were calculated using simulation (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; 
Krinsky, Robb 1991). To identify periods of significant change, in addition, the first derivate spline was calcu-
lated using finite differences and tested against zero with a 95% confidence interval (Simpson 2014). 
4 The x-dimension in each panel shows the time remaining until election day. Within each panel, the smoothed 
share of respondents mentioning an issue is shown together with a 95% confidence interval and bold segments of 
the fitted line highlight periods of significant change. 
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Rattinger 2015; Schoen 2010). During the campaign, the Minister of Defence, Franz-Josef 
Jung (CDU), first tried to downplay the issue by emphasizing the necessity of the airstrike and 
denying civilian casualties, but shortly after the Federal Government had to acknowledged the 
civilian casualties that were caused by the bombing (Sattler 2013), leading to quite some pub-
lic debate and causing a significant spike in media coverage.5 Similarly, in 2013 concern in-
ternational affairs surged four weeks before the election. The rise of public concern in this 
case is most likely to be related to news about the Syrian conflict that broke during that time. 
Specifically, the Syrian government had used chemical weapons against civilians in the city 
of Ghouta causing a large number of civilian deaths (United Nations 2013) which led to a 
public debate about a possible humanitarian intervention in Syria, raising as well the question 
of a potential German involvement. As it became clear rather quickly that an intervention was 
lacking political and public support in many countries, the issue disappeared quickly from the 
news agenda and public concern about issue faded as well. The sudden rise (and fall) of issues 
such as defence policy and international politics found here is in line with other research that 
has pointed out that issues in the area of foreign affairs are often highly susceptible to agenda-
setting effects because these issues can be experienced by the public mainly through the mass 
media (Althaus, Kim 2006; Cohen 1963; Iyengar, Simon 1993; Krosnick, Brannon 1993; 
Soroka 2003; Zucker 1978). 
Another example of this is the concern about civil rights and liberties in 2013 where public 
concern significantly decreased during the first weeks of the observation period. The height-
ened levels of concern about civil rights and liberties in that year are likely related to the reve-
lations about the mass surveillance of electronic communication by foreign intelligence agen-
cies that had caused up considerable public debate and amounts of coverage. The public de-
bate had been ongoing over the preceding months, but came quickly came to an end when 
about six weeks before the election the Head of the Federal Chancellery, Ronald Pofalla 
(CDU), declared that the allegations against the foreign intelligence services were “off the 
table”. As the actions of intelligence services are essentially impossible to observe in daily 
life, it seems very plausible that such an issue is particularly susceptible to the influence of 
media coverage. 
 
                                                
5 For the dynamics of the media coverage, see Figure A1 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 2: Dynamics of the public agenda, 2009 & 2013 
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Finally, a number of issues seems less evidently related to the news coverage of policy issues, 
but may instead rather be related to campaign efforts of the political parties. For instance, in 
2009 some increase in public concern occurred in the following four policy areas: law and 
domestic security, energy policy, health policy, wages and working conditions and education. 
Some of these issues seem rather suitable to carry a symbolic meaning and therefore seem 
suitable to activate latent supporters. Specifically, law and domestic security can be consid-
ered as an issue traditionally owned by the Christian Democrats, energy policy has been an 
issue owned by the Greens, and wages and working conditions are a theme traditionally ad-
dressed by parties on the left such as Social Democrats and the Left party. Likewise, in 2013 
the public became increasingly concerned about issues such as seniors and retirement, wages 
and working conditions, social policy and social justice (at least for a short time). The analy-
sis of campaign advertisement confirms that voters became increasingly exposed to such is-
sues (see Figure A2 in the Appendix) during the election campaigns. Therefore, it seems like-
ly that at least some of the increase in public concern about these issues was initiated by the 
advertisement campaigns of the political parties. 
 
6 Explaining agenda dynamics 
To test the first hypothesis, separate models for each issue that displayed significant dynamics 
were estimated (full estimation results see Table A1 in the Appendix). For two out of these 
these issues significant media agenda-setting effects can be found (see Figure 3)6: Defence 
policy (2009) and international politics (2013). These results show that the media can influ-
ence voters’ concern about political issues by emphasizing the issue. The initial impact is 
even extremely large which is line with the notion of the mass media as a powerful agenda-
setter. For instance, in case of the issue of civil rights and liberties in 2013, the initial impact 
reaches almost 100 percent which implies that if somebody saw most of the available news 
                                                
6 Figure 3 shows first differences representing the change in probability when moving from the minimum value 
to 97.5 percent of the maximum value of perceived media content. The reason for not moving to the maximum is 
that in some cases this may cause extreme predictions due to the presence of outliers which would lead to an 
exaggeration of the impact of the media coverage (see, ). Alongside the main estimate Figure 3 displays 95%-
confidence bands. Figure 3 only displays the dynamic impact of the perceived news content for those models 
with an effective degree of freedom > 0 (see full estimation tables in Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix) as 
in the remaining cases the smooth term representing the effect of news exposure effectively gets penalized out of 
the model, meaning that news exposure had no impact on the issue importance and that the term should essen-
tially be omitted from the model to improve model fit. 
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stories about this issues on the day of the interview, this person would almost certainly would 
name the problem as one of the most important issues. 
Yet, at the same time – in line with the agenda-cueing hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) – the evi-
dence confirms as well that the impact of media coverage is strictly limited by voters’ 
memory as the initial impact declines rather quickly over time. Essentially, news coverage 
raises voters’ concern about an issue for up to ten days, according to the central estimate (sol-
id line). The uncertainty of this estimate, however, is quite high in case of the defence issue in 
2009. Here, the impact of news coverage is significantly different from zero at the 5%-level 
only in the first few days and towards later lags the uncertainty bounds become extremely 
wide. The reason for this most likely is that the defence coverage only surged very shortly 
before the election, so that the impact of higher-order lags is essentially unobserved. In 2013, 
the coverage about the civil rights and liberties, in contrast, occurred early during the cam-
paign and the uncertainty bounds are much narrower as a consequence. Here, the analysis 
confirms a significant impact of the news coverage lasting for 7 days. Thus, although the ini-
tial effect of media coverage on issue salience is very large, it is only very short-lived lasting 
only for a couple of days. 
 
Figure 3: Dynamic impact of likely perceived news content (28 lags) 
 
  
For the remaining issues, no significant agenda-setting effects can be detected. Nevertheless, 
three more issues show a similar declining pattern as the two previously mentioned issues. In 
particular, international politics, immigration and wages and working conditions show a slight 
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tendency that recent exposure to media content raises the salience of these issues. In case of 
international politics, the effect almost reaches significance and it might just be product of 
chance that this effect remains below the threshold in this case. In other cases, one reason for 
the weak or absence of agenda-setting effects is most likely that these issues received only 
minimal news coverage (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Thus, the absence of agenda-setting 
effects in these cases is most likely due to the lack of sufficient news coverage, which is a 
pre-condition to study agenda-setting effects, instead of being evidence of anything else. 
 
Table 1: Net impact of perceived ad content 
2009 AME 
Defence policy 25.26 (8.78)** 
Law & domestic security 12.45 (5.68)* 
Energy policy 15.09 (4.32)*** 
Health policy 10.45 (9.50) 
Wages & working conditions 0.16 (4.18) 
Economic policy -2.29 (4.36) 
Education & cultural policy 0.58 (2.49) 
2013 
 
Employment -3.46 (10.26) 
Economic policy -1.37 (2.76) 
International politics -4.75 (12.49) 
Law & domestic security -0.00 (0.00) 
Civil rights & liberties 6.67 (6.89) 
Immigration -29.22 (24.17) 
Social policy & social justice -4.01 (4.06) 
Seniors & retirement 3.47 (3.38) 
Wages & work conditions 9.32 (4.49)* 
Note: Table summarizes the effect of a 0-1 change in the 
variable “Ad exposure: Yes (means)” which is equal to the 
change in probability when voters on average are likely to 
have seen at least one ad mentioning the issue. See Table A1 
and A2 in the Appendix for full estimation results. 
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To examine Hypothesis 2, in addition to the measure of perceived media content an additional 
measure of perceived ad content was included in the model. Table 1 displays the results.7 In 
several cases an overall unit increase in exposure to issue content through ads leads to a sig-
nificant increase in the probability to name the issue as one of the most important issues. Spe-
cifically, in 2009 these issues include defence policy, law and domestic security, and energy 
policy. Compared to the latter to issues, in particular, the effect on the salience of defence 
policy was particularly pronounced. Defence policy in this year was exclusively addressed by 
advertisement of the Left party with the Left being the only party that outspokenly opposed 
the military operation in Afghanistan at the time. Thus, the issue was clearly owned by the 
Left party – a condition that has been found to enhance the impact of advertising in experi-
ments (Ansolabehere, Iyengar 1994). Yet, the presence of the issue in the media might have 
also contributed to that, even though, experimental research so far has not confirmed such an 
interactive effect. 
In 2013, the only significant impact of advertisement concerns wages and working conditions. 
This issue figured particularly prominently in the campaign advertisement of the Social Dem-
ocrats, but also Greens and the Left party were campaigning on that issue. In this case, thus, 
the issue was not strictly owned by one single party. Nevertheless, exposure to ad content 
addressing the issue raised the probability that the issue was considered as being important. 
For none of the remaining issues advertising significantly affected the public agenda. The 
estimates are typically smaller or subject to quite some uncertainty which might imply that the 
perceived advertising may have been less sweeping in these cases or that only small audiences 
were reached. Overall, the analysis confirms that despite the legal restrictions on campaign 
advertising in Germany, the political parties are able to shape the public agenda with their 
advertisement campaigns. 
 
 
 
                                                
7 The findings of the advertisement effects reported here are the longitudinal effects at the aggregate level and 
are therefore not conflated with individual-level heterogeneity. Individual-level variation in this case has been 
removed from the measure by group-mean centering (see also Lebo & Weber, 2015). 
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Figure 4: Dynamic impact of likely perceived news content by news outlet (28 lags) 
  
 
Finally, to test the hypothesis about the role of media fragmentation (Hypothesis 3), the mod-
els showing significant media agenda-setting effects–defence policy (2009) and civil rights 
and liberties (2013)–were re-estimated differentiating between different types of media. The 
results are shown in Figure 4 (for full estimation tables, see Table A3). These results show 
that the traditional mass media seem to be more effective agenda-setters than more entertain-
ment-oriented or opinionated information sources. In 2009, the increase in salience of the 
defence issue is mainly related to the perceived coverage from local newspapers. This finding 
demonstrates the importance of local newspapers which often are neglected when studying 
agenda-setting and other types of media effects (Schönbach 1983). Apart from that, only a 
weak increase for private television becomes apparent. However, the impact of exposure to 
issue content on private television turns out to be insignificant. 
In 2013, the agenda-setting effect is mainly driven by the agenda-setting power of public tele-
vision. Again, the initial impact is very strong and declines over time, confirming the expecta-
tion that the main mechanism behind agenda-setting effects is agenda-cueing. For the remain-
ing information sources no significant agenda-setting effects can observed and even the point 
estimates are close to zero. Taken together, the evidence from these two campaigns confirms 
the notion that mainly the traditional mass media serve as agenda-setters, whereas other media 
seem to be less effective.  
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To sum up, the analyses confirm both the media’s agenda-setting power as well as the limita-
tions to agenda-setting. First of all, although the short-term initial impact of perceived news 
content turns out to be very strong, the media’s influence on issue salience declines very 
quickly within a couple of days after exposure. Most likely, this is a consequence of memory 
decay: As soon as the political information evades is no longer active in voters’ memory as a 
result of recent exposure, the information becomes discarded and can no longer serve as a cue 
to determine what are the most important issues. Secondly, the media apparently are not the 
only relevant suppliers of political information during election campaigns. Despite the legal 
restrictions on advertising the analyses support the hypothesis that campaign advertisement 
may shape as well public priorities. Finally, the traditional mass media–in particular, public-
service television and local newspapers–have been identified as the most effective agenda-
setters. Entertainment-oriented outlets, more opinionated sources, or sources that allow for 
highly selective news consumption, in contrast, seem to be less suitable to influence the pub-
lic agenda.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the agenda-setting dynamics during the campaign period at the 
2009 and the 2013 German federal elections. The media have often been considered as the 
most powerful agenda-setter during election campaigns. Yet, some studies suggest the me-
dia’s influence may in fact be more limited than often believed. In particular, three factors 
have been investigated here that may pose limits on the media’s agenda-setting influence: 
voters’ memory, the advertising by the political parties, and the fragmentation of the media 
system. The impact of the media coverage on the public agenda were investigated making use 
of a very rich data basis generated by the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) by 
linking media content analysis data to voter survey data that has been gathered according to 
the rules of the rolling cross-section design (Johnston, Brady 2002; Kenski, Gottfried, and 
Jamieson 2011). The analyses have provided support for the idea that media are in fact a 
powerful agenda-setter, but that its influence is nevertheless constrained by voters’ cognitive 
capacities and the structure of the campaign information environment. 
With regard to the first research questions–(1) whether higher levels of issue coverage lead to 
an increase in public concern about an issue–the analysis has shown that media coverage does 
have an impact on the public agenda. A pre-condition for this, however, is that there are suffi-
ciently large amounts of coverage that reach a substantive share of the population. Otherwise 
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the effect in the aggregate would be too small to shift the public agenda into one direction. As 
the media selectively emphasize “newsworthy” issues, agenda-setting effects were mostly 
present for the few most intensely debated issues of the election campaign. In 2009, signifi-
cant media agenda-setting occurred after news about an airstrike in Afghanistan causing civil-
ian casualties broke, raising public concern about the military mission. In 2013, the Snowden 
revelations about mass surveillance produced sufficient amounts of news coverage to have an 
impact on public priorities. The immediate impact of the media coverage in these cases was 
even extremely large initially, but declined very quickly thereafter. 
This leads to the second research question of how long agenda-setting effects last. The anal-
yses have demonstrated agenda-setting effects during the campaign period tend to be rather 
short-lived and decline within a couple of days. According to the estimates, after about ten 
days, voters will not care much about the news they have recently been exposed to. The rapid 
decline of the agenda-setting effect indicates that voters’ limited memory capacities reduce 
the potential influence of media on elections. After a short-term excitement, people seem to 
forget about the issue that they encounter in the daily news rather quickly. This memory de-
cay is indicative of agenda-cueing and a rather superficial mode of information-processing. 
Once the information gets discarded from the short-term memory, voters’ priorities seem re-
vert to their baseline, without much permanent change in their political priorities. This does 
not preclude that voters may engage in more thorough agenda-reasoning in more controlled 
settings (Bulkow, Urban, and Schweiger 2013; McCombs, Stroud 2014). But under real-
world conditions voters seem to rather satisfice and invest only quite limited effort to process 
the daily news for most part. 
The third research question of this chapter focussed on whether parties can effectively bypass 
the media through advertising and directly influence public concern about issues. Usually, 
during election campaigns parties seek to highlight issues that they “own” in order to activate 
their latent supporters (Petrocik 1996; Walgrave, van Aelst 2006). The analysis supported the 
notion that the parties are able to shape the public agenda by means of advertising. Although 
the parties were not successful with each and every issue, they still managed to increase the 
public awareness of political problems in several instances. This shows that campaign agen-
das not only reflect the priorities by the media and the voters, but also those of the political 
parties (Dalton et al. 1998). Thus, although political advertising is subject to quite strong legal 
restrictions in the German context allowing only for a rather low intensity of advertisement 
exposure, parties seem to be able to bypass the media and bring some of their own issues to 
the public agenda. 
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Finally, the fourth research question addressed the role of media fragmentation. Over past 
decades, media systems have become more fragmented. Previous research has argued that 
with the proliferation of news sources voters increasingly may choose to opt out of political 
news altogether (Prior 2007) or may select into opinionated sources that supply them with 
congruent information (Iyengar, Kinder 2010; Stroud 2011). In the German case, in particular, 
the rise of private television and online media has added continuously more and more infor-
mation sources to choose from for the voters. In line with the arguments by previous research 
the analyses have demonstrated, however, that these new sources are less effective agenda-
setters than traditional mass media such as local newspapers or public-service television that 
usually feature more political content and facilitate inadvertent exposure. This finding implies 
that to the extent that voters substitute traditional mass media with more entertainment-
oriented or highly selective opinionated information sources, the more these voters are likely 
to form their own idiosyncratic agendas. 
Overall, these findings have important implications for the pre-conditions under which the 
media may be able to influence elections: Most notably, when a topic becomes highly salient 
shortly before an election, this has the potential to sway a close race into one direction rather 
than the other–even when the message content is rather meaningless. Late shocks to the news 
agenda may thus produce a situation in which indeed the media, rather than the voters, decide 
about the election outcome. To reduce the media’s influence, the political parties can try to 
reach voters directly by means of advertisement. By establishing direct channels of communi-
cation, the political parties can provide their supporters with information about issues that are 
suitable to activate voters’ predispositions. Finally, increasing media fragmentation may fur-
ther reduce agenda-setting effects to the extent that voters substitute traditional mass media 
with either more entertainment-oriented information sources or such opinionated sources that 
allow for high selectivity. Thus, although the media may serve as a powerful agenda-setter 
during the campaign period, their power finds its limits in voters’ cognitive capacities and the 
structure of the campaign information environment. 
 
References 
Allison, Paul D. (2010), 'Missing Data', in James D. Wright and Peter V. Marsden (eds.), Handbook of Survey 
Research (2 edn.; Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing), 631-58. 
Althaus, Scott L. and Young Mie Kim (2006), 'Priming effects in complex information environments: 
Reassessing the impact of news discourse on presidential approval', Journal of Politics, 68/4, 960-76. 
Anderson, Christopher J and Jason D Hecht (2012), 'Voting when the economy goes bad, everyone is in charge, 
and no one is to blame: The case of the 2009 German election', Electoral Studies, 31, 5-19. 
 25 
Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shanto Iyengar (1994), 'Riding the wave and claiming ownership over issues: The 
joint effects of advertising and news coverage in campaigns', Public Opinion Quarterly, 58/3, 335-57. 
Atwater, Tony, Michael B. Salwen, and Ronald B. Anderson (1985), 'Media agenda-setting with environmental 
issues', Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 62/2, 393-97. 
Beck, Paul Allen, et al. (2002), 'The social calculus of voting: Interpersonal, media, and organizational 
influences on presidential choices', American Political Science Review, 96, 57-73. 
Bennett, W. Lance and Shanto Iyengar (2008), 'A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing Foundations of 
Political Communication', Journal of Communication, 58/4, 707-31. 
Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee (1954). Voting: A study of opinion formation 
in a presidential campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Brady, Henry E. and Richard Johnston (2006), 'The Rolling Cross-Section and Causal Attribution', in Henry E 
Brady and Richard Johnston (eds.), Capturing Campaign Effects (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press), 164-95. 
Budge, Ian and Dennis J. Farlie (1983). Explaining and predicting elections: Issue effects and party strategies in 
23 democracies. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Bulkow, Kristin, Juliane Urban, and Wolfgang Schweiger (2013), 'The duality of agenda-setting: The role of 
information processing', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 25/1, 43-63. 
Chaffee, Steven H. and Miriam J. Metzger (2001), 'The End of Mass Communication?', Mass Communication & 
Society, 4/4, 365-79. 
Cohen, Bernard C. (1963). The press and foreign policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Dalton, Russell J, Paul A Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt (1998), 'Partisan cues and the media: Information flows in 
the 1992 presidential election', American Political Science Review, 92, 111-26. 
Dalton, Russell J, et al. (1998), 'A test of media-centered agenda setting: Newspaper content and public interests 
in a presidential election', Political Communication, 15/4, 463-81. 
Dearing, James W. and Everett Rogers (1996). Agenda-setting.6. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Eagly, Alice H. and Shelly Chaiken (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, Brace, & 
Janovich. 
Eichhorn, Wolfgang (1996). Agenda-Setting-Prozesse: Eine theoretische Analyse individueller und 
gesellschaftlicher Themenstrukturierung. München: Verlag Reinhard Fischer. 
Erbring, Lutz, Edie N. Goldenberg, and Arthur H. Miller (1980), 'Front-page news and real-world cues: A new 
look at agenda-setting by the media', American Journal of Political Science, 24/1, 16-49. 
Fahrmeir, Ludwig and Thomas Kneib (2011), 'Bayesian Smoothing and Regression for Longitudinal, Spatial and 
Event History Data', Oxford Statistical Science, 36. 
Fazekas, Zoltan and Erik Gahner Larsen (2016), 'Media content and political behavior in observational research: 
A critical assessment', British Journal of Political Science, 46/1, 195-204. 
Funkhouser, G. Ray (1973), 'The Issues of the Sixties: An Exploratory Study in the Dynamics of Public 
Opinion', Public Opinion Quarterly, 37/1, 62-75. 
Gehrau, Volker (2014), 'Die Dynamik gesellschaftlicher Problemwahrnehmung II: Erkentnisse aus vier 
Fallstudien', in Volker Gehrau, Judith Väth, and Gianna Haake (eds.), Dynamiken öffentlicher 
Problemwahrnehmung: Umwelt, Terrorismus und Konsumklima in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit  251-
66. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Gehrau, Volker, Judith Väth, and Gianna Haake (2014). Dynamiken der öffentlichen Problemwahrnehmung: 
Umwelt, Terrorismus, Rechtsextremismus und Konsumklima in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit. 
Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Giebler, Heiko and Wagner Aiko (2015), 'Wirtschaft, Krise und Wahlverhalten: Eine Einführung', in Heiko 
Giebler and Wagner Aiko (eds.), Wirtschaft, Krise und Wahlverhalten  9-47. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Golan, Guy (2006), 'Inter-media agenda setting and global news coverage: Assessing the influence of the New 
York Times on three network television evening news programs', Journalism Studies, 7/2, 323-33. 
Grimmer, Justin and Brandon M Stewart (2013), 'Text as data: The promise and pitfalls of automatic content 
analysis methods for political texts', Political Analysis, mps028. 
Hallin, Daniel C. and Paolo Mancini (2004). Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hastie, Trevor J and Robert J Tibshirani (1990), 'Generalized Additive Models'. 
Holtz-Bacha, Christina and Lynda L. Kaid (2006), 'Political advertising in international comparison', in Lynda L. 
Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Political Advertising  3-14. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Iyengar, Shanto (1990), 'The accessibility bias in politics: Television news and public opinion', International 
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 2/1, 1-15. 
Iyengar, Shanto and Donald R. Kinder (1987). News that matters: Agenda Setting and Priming in a Television 
Age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 26 
Iyengar, Shanto and Adam Simon (1993), 'News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public-Opinion - a Study of 
Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing', Communication Research, 20, 365-83. 
Iyengar, Shanto and Kyu S. Hahn (2009), 'Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media 
use', Journal of Communication, 59/1, 19-39. 
Iyengar, Shanto and Donald R. Kinder (2010). News that matters: Television and American opinion. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Johnston, Richard and Henry E. Brady (2002), 'The Rolling Cross-Section Design', Electoral Studies, 21, 283-
95. 
Kaid, Lynda Lee and Christina Holtz-Bacha (2006). The Sage Handbook of Political Advertising. Sage 
Publications. 
Keele, Luke John (2008), 'Semiparametric regression for the social sciences'. 
Kenski, Kate, Jeffrey A. Gottfried, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2011), 'The Rolling Cross-Section: Design and 
Utility for Political Research', in Erik P. Bucy and R. Lance Holbert (eds.), The Sourcebook for 
Political Communication Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques (New York: 
Routledge), 34-54. 
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000), 'Making the most of statistical analyses: Improving 
interpretation and presentation', American Journal of Political Science, 44/2, 347-61. 
Krewel, Mona (2014), 'Die Wahlkampagnen der Parteien und ihr Kontext', Zwischen Fragmentierung und 
Konzentration: Die Bundestagswahl 2013  35-46. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Krewel, Mona, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, and Ansgar Wolsing (2011), 'The Campaign and its Dynamics at the 
2009 German General Election', German Politics, 20/1, 28-50. 
Krinsky, Itzhak and A. Leslie Robb (1991), 'Three methods for calculating the statistical properties of 
elasticities: A comparison', Empirical Economics, 16/2, 199-209. 
Krosnick, Jon A and Laura A Brannon (1993), 'The impact of war on the ingredients of presidential evaluations: 
George Bush and the Gulf conflict', American Political Science Review, 87, 963-75. 
Lebo, Matthew J and Christopher Weber (2015), 'An Effective Approach to the Repeated Cross-Sectional 
Design', American Journal of Political Science, 59/1, 242-58. 
Lin, Xihong and Daowen Zhang (1999), 'Inference in generalized additive mixed modelsby using smoothing 
splines', Journal of the royal statistical society: Series b (statistical methodology), 61/2, 381-400. 
Lopez-Escobar, Esteban, Juan Pablo Llamas, and Maxwell McCombs (1998), 'Agenda setting and community 
consensus: First and second level effects', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 10/2, 335-
48. 
Maurer, Marcus (2010). Agenda-setting. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
McCombs, Maxwell E. (2012), 'Civic Osmosis: The Social Impact of Media', Comunicación y Sociedad, 
XXV/1, 7-14. 
--- (2014). Setting the agenda: The mass media and public opinion. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw (1972), 'The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media', Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 36/2, 176-87. 
McCombs, Maxwell E. and Natalie J. Stroud (2014), 'Psychology of Agenda-Setting Effects Mapping the Paths 
of Information Processing', Review of Communication Research, 2/1, 68-88. 
Miller, Joanne M. and Jon A. Krosnick (2000), 'News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential 
Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens are Guided by a Trusted Source', American Journal of 
Political Science, 44/2, 301-15. 
Obermeier, Viola, et al. (2015), 'Flexible distributed lags for modelling earthquake data', Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series C (Applied Statistics), 64/2, 395-412. 
Partheymüller, Julia (2014), 'Die Dynamik von Mobilisierung und Meinungswandel im Wahlkampf', in Rüdiger 
Schmitt-Beck, Hans Rattinger, Sigrid Roßteutscher, Bernhard Weßels, and Christof Wolf (eds.), 
Zwischen Fragmentierung und Konzentration: Die Bundestagswahl 2013  73-87. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos. 
Partheymüller, Julia, Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, and Christian Hoops (2013). Kampagnendynamik bei der 
Bundestagswahl 2013: Die Rolling Cross-Section-Studie im Rahmen der “German Longitudinal 
Election Study” 2013, MZES Working Papers Mannheim: MZES.  
Petrocik, John R. (1996), 'Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study', American Journal 
of Political Science, 40/3, 825-50. 
Petty, Richard E and John T. Cacioppo (1986). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion: Central and 
Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change. New York: Springer. 
Pingree, Raymond J. and Elizabeth Stoycheff (2013), 'Differentiating Cueing From Reasoning in Agenda-Setting 
Effects', Journal of Communication, 63/5, 852-72. 
Pötzschke, Jana, Harald Schoen, and Hans Rattinger (2015), 'Mehr als ein Thema für Spezialisten? Der 
Afghanistaneinsatz der Bundeswehr und das Wahlverhalten bei der Bundestagswahl 2009', in Heiko 
 27 
Biehl and Harald Schoen (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte im Urteil der Bürger  123-46. 
Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Prior, Markus (2007). Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political 
Involvement and Polarizes Elections. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Rattinger, Hans, et al. (2015a), 'Campaign Media Content Analysis: TV (GLES 2009)', GESIS Data Archive, 
ZA5306, Data file Version 1.2.0. 
Rattinger, Hans, et al. (2012), 'Campaign Media Content Analysis: Print Media (GLES 2009)', GESIS Data 
Archive, ZA5307, Data file Version 1.0.0. 
Rattinger, Hans, et al. (2013), 'Rolling Cross-Section Campaign Survey with Post-election Panel Wave (GLES 
2009)', GESIS Data Archive, ZA5303, Data file Version 6.0.0. 
Rattinger, Hans, et al. (2014), 'Rolling Cross-Section Campaign Survey with Post-election Panel Wave (GLES 
2013)', GESIS data archive, ZA5703, Data file Version 2.0.0. 
Rattinger, Hans, et al. (2015b), 'Campaign Media Content Analysis: TV (GLES 2013)', GESIS Data Archive, 
ZA5705, Data file Version 1.0.0. 
--- (2015c), 'Campaign Media Content Analysis: Print Media (GLES 2013)', GESIS Data Archive, ZA5706, Data 
file Version 1.0.0. 
Rosar, Ulrich and Hanna Hoffmann (2015), 'Einflüsse der Bewertung der Kanzlerkandidaten Steinbrück und 
Merkel auf die Wahlchancen ihrer Parteien bei der Bundestagswahl 2013: War er der Falsche, war sie 
die Richtige?', in Karl-Rudolf Korte (ed.), Die Bundestagswahl 2013: Analysen der Wahl-, Parteien-, 
Kommunikations- und Regierungsforschung  119-39. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Rössler, Patrick (1999). Agenda-Setting: Theoretische Annahmen und empirische Evidenzen einer 
Medienwirkungshypothese. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Rubin, David C. and Amy E. Wenzel (1996), 'One hundred years of forgetting: A quantitative description of 
retention', Psychological review, 103/4, 734-60. 
Rubin, David C., Sean Hinton, and Amy E. Wenzel (1999), 'The precise time course of retention', Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25/5, 1161-76. 
Ruppert, David, Matt P Wand, and Raymond J Carroll (2003), 'Semiparametric regression'. 
Sattler, Karl-Otto (2013), 'Verhängnisvoller Befehl: Der Luftangriff bei Kundus und die Folgen', Das Parlament, 
29-31. 
Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger, Thorsten Faas, and Ansgar Wolsing (2010). Kampagnendynamik bei der 
Bundestagswahl 2009: Die Rolling-Cross-Section-Studie im Rahmen der "German Longitudinal 
Election Study" 2009, MZES Working Papers Mannheim: MZES.  
Schoen, Harald (2010), 'Ein Bericht von der Heimatfront: Bürger, Politiker und der Afghanistaneinsatz der 
Bundeswehr', Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 51/3, 395-408. 
Schönbach, Klaus (1983). Das unterschätzte Medium: Politische Wirkungen von Presse und Fernsehen im 
Vergleich.16. München: KG Saur. 
Schönbach, Klaus and Holli A. Semetko (1992), 'Agenda-Setting, Agenda-Reinforcing or Agenda-Deflating: A 
Study of the 1990 German National Election', Journalism Quarterly, 69/4, 837-46. 
Schuck, Andreas R. T., Rens Vliegenthart, and Claes H. De Vreese (2016a), 'Matching Theory and Data: Why 
Combining Media Content with Survey Data Matters', British Journal of Political Science, 46/1, 205-
13. 
--- (2016b), 'Who's Afraid of Conflict? The Mobilizing Effect of Conflict Framing in Campaign News', British 
Journal of Political Science, 46/1, 177-94. 
Schulz, W. (2005), 'Voters in a Changing Media Environment: A Data-Based Retrospective on Consequences of 
Media Change in Germany', European Journal of Communication, 20, 55-88. 
Selb, Peter (2003). Agenda-Setting Prozesse im Wahlkampf. Bern: Haupt Verlag. 
Simon, Adam F. (2002), 'The Winning Message: Candidate Behavior, Campaign Discourse and Democracy'. 
Simpson, Gavin (2014), 'Identifying periods of change in time series with GAMs'. 
Soroka, Stuart N. (2002). Agenda-setting dynamics in Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
--- (2003), 'Media, public opinion, and foreign policy', The International Journal of Press/Politics, 8/1, 27-48. 
Stroud, Natalie Jomini (2011). Niche news: The politics of news choice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Takeshita, Toshio (2006), 'Current critical problems in agenda-setting research', International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research, 18/3, 275-96. 
Tenscher, Jens (2012), 'Haupt-und Nebenwahlkämpfe in Deutschland und Österreich', Zeitschrift für 
Parlamentsfragen, 43/1, 113-31. 
United Nations 'Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical 
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of 
Damascus on 21 August 2013', <http://tinyurl.com/jqs5fuw>, accessed 01.05.2015. 
Vavreck, Lynn (2009). The message matters: The economy and presidential campaigns. Princeton 
: Princeton University Press. 
 28 
Walgrave, Stefaan and Peter van Aelst (2006), 'The Contingency of the Mass Media's Political Agenda Setting 
Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory', Journal of Communication, 56/1, 88-109. 
Walgrave, Stefaan, Stuart Soroka, and Michiel Nuytemans (2008), 'The Mass Media's Political Agenda-Setting 
Power: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media, Parliament, and Government in Belgium (1993 to 2000)', 
Comparative Political Studies, 41/6, 814-36. 
Wanta, Wayne and Yu-Wei Hu (1994), 'Time-Lag Differences in the Agenda-Setting Process: An Examination 
of Five News Media', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 6/3, 225-40. 
Watt, James H., Mary Mazza, and Leslie Snyder (1993), 'Agenda-setting effects of television news coverage and 
the effects decay curve', Communication research, 20/3, 408-35. 
Weaver, David H., et al. (1981). Media agenda-setting in a presidential election: Issues, images, and interest. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
Weischenberg, Siegfried, Maja Malik, and Armin Scholl (2006a). Die Souffleure der Mediengesellschaft: Report 
über die Journalisten in Deutschland. Konstanz: UVK. 
--- (2006b), 'Journalismus in Deutschland 2005', Media Perspektiven, 7, 346-61. 
Willnat, Lars and David H. Weaver (2014). The American Journalist in the Digital Age: Key Findings. 
Bloomington, IN: School of Journalism, Indiana University. 
Wolling, Jens (2002), 'Methodenkombination in der Medienwirkungsforschung: Der Entscheidungsprozess bei 
der Verknüpfung von Umfrage- und Inhaltsanalysedaten', ZUMA-Nachrichten, 50, 54-85. 
Wood, Simon (2006). Generalized Additive Models: An Introduction with R. Boca Raton: Chapman and 
Hall/CRC. 
--- (2011), 'Fast stable restricted maximum likelihood and marginal likelihood estimation of semiparametric 
generalized linear models', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series (B), 73, 3-36. 
--- (2015), 'Package ‘mgcv’', R package version, 1.8-12. 
Zucker, Harold G. (1978), 'The variable nature of news media influence', Communication yearbook, 2, 225-40. 
 
 
Harald Schoen/Sigrid Roßteutscher/Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck/Bernhard Weßels/Christof Wolf 
(eds.), Voters and Voting in Context: Multiple Contexts and Heterogeneous Electorates. 
 
Title:    Agenda-setting dynamics during the campaign period (APPENDIX) 
Authors:  Julia Partheymüller 
 
 
 
Dynamics of key independent variables 
 
 
Figure A 1: Dynamics of perceived media attention, 2009-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 2: Dynamics of perceived advertisement, 2009-2013 
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Full estimation tables 
 
 
Table A 1: Agenda-setting effects, 2009 
 German federal election, 2009 
Level 2 
   Level 1 
Defence policy Law & domestic 
security 
Energy policy Health policy Wages & working 
conditions 
Economic policy Education & 
cultural policy 
Non-parametric terms        
Perceived news content (28 lags) 4.00 (Fig.3) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.98 (Fig.3) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 
Time trend 0.53 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 
Random effect 16.63 (–)* 16.43 (–)** 7.84 (–) 1.68 (–) 7.97 (–) 2.04 (–) 0.01 (–) 
 
Parametric terms 
       
Parametric terms        
Perceived ad content: Yes (means) 25.26 (8.78)** 12.45 (5.68)* 15.09 (4.32)*** 10.45 (9.50) 0.16 (4.18) -2.29 (4.36) 0.58 (2.49) 
Perceived ad content: Not asked 4.44 (4.21) 5.50 (4.38) 9.38 (5.13)* 3.66 (2.97) -1.84 (1.78) 0.68 (4.47) -3.34 (3.28) 
   Perceived ad content: Yes 0.33 (0.80) -1.32 (0.80) 0.30 (0.50) -1.68 (1.70) 0.29 (0.70) -0.52 (0.89) -0.09 (0.53) 
   Public TV news use -1.42 (1.54) -0.24 (0.53) -0.04 (0.59) -1.13 (0.73) 0.72 (0.65) -1.60 (1.26) 1.87 (1.03) 
   Private TV news use -0.24 (1.39) 1.54 (0.73)* -3.07 (1.28)* 0.48 (1.12) 0.23 (0.77) -5.08 (2.11)* -5.64 (1.91)** 
   Quality newspaper use -0.12 (2.02) 2.38 (1.14)* -1.94 (1.36) 0.66 (1.72) -2.39 (1.80) 4.12 (3.24) 1.51 (2.19) 
   Tabloid newspaper use -0.52 (2.74) 0.21 (1.41) 0.41 (1.82) -1.40 (2.28) -0.62 (1.38) 4.78 (3.68) 0.42 (3.12) 
   Local newspaper use 1.61 (1.13) 0.55 (0.71) 0.03 (0.78) 1.26 (1.02) 0.18 (1.43) 3.67 (1.87) -0.50 (1.42) 
   Online news use -1.85 (1.66) -2.51 (1.44) -0.08 (1.14) 3.66 (1.47)* 1.60 (2.28) -0.32 (3.00) 1.36 (2.05) 
   Political conversations 0.32 (1.33) 0.43 (1.06) 0.76 (1.15) -2.03 (1.53) 1.73 (0.97) -4.14 (2.83) 5.16 (2.04)* 
   Political interest 0.08 (1.60) -1.51 (1.36) 2.23 (1.49) -2.08 (1.76) 0.08 (1.18) 11.55 (3.14)*** 10.89 (2.62)*** 
   Education (ref.: Low):        
   - Medium -0.15 (1.05) 0.31 (0.87) -0.48 (0.94) -1.63 (1.18) -1.55 (0.95) 7.79 (2.20)*** 2.15 (1.63) 
   - High 0.17 (1.12) -0.59 (0.90) 0.94 (1.01) 0.44 (1.23) -1.99 (1.02)* 13.37 (2.23)*** 7.65 (1.69)*** 
   Party ID (ref.: None):        
   - CDU/CSU -0.75 (0.92) 0.42 (0.79) -0.50 (0.78) -0.54 (1.05) -0.72 (0.66) 12.46 (1.92)*** 1.38 (1.48) 
   - SPD -0.31 (1.00) -0.23 (0.77) 0.64 (0.84) 0.22 (1.15) 1.12 (0.83) 2.73 (2.01) 3.26 (1.57)* 
   - FDP -1.81 (1.47) 0.61 (1.50) -1.28 (1.09) 0.32 (1.87) 1.58 (1.56) 7.85 (3.21)* 0.30 (2.39) 
   - Greens 0.95 (1.44) -1.59 (0.97) 3.70 (1.31)** -1.42 (1.33) -0.74 (1.03) -1.13 (2.66) 3.56 (2.00) 
   - Left party 6.96 (2.37)*** 0.54 (1.53) -2.05 (1.31) -0.89 (1.99) 2.89 (1.58)* -9.68 (3.53)** -0.05 (2.77) 
   - Other party 3.86 (4.01) 5.71 (3.96)* 0.43 (3.08) -4.63 (3.36) 1.54 (2.61) 4.35 (6.16) -0.34 (4.86) 
   Religion (ref.: None/other):        
   - Catholic 1.62 (1.27) -1.65 (1.10) -0.00 (1.01) 1.94 (1.34) -0.52 (1.13) 1.29 (2.53) -2.38 (1.90) 
   - Protestant 0.91 (1.03) -0.79 (1.03) 0.86 (0.95) 1.47 (1.18) -1.40 (0.91) 2.19 (2.33) -0.51 (1.74) 
   Church attendance -2.06 (1.38) 1.35 (1.19) -0.36 (1.19) 0.10 (1.50) -0.26 (1.22) -2.91 (2.93) -0.77 (2.14) 
   Class (ref: Old middle class):        
   - Worker 2.95 (1.53)* 0.81 (1.04) -1.06 (1.29) -0.80 (1.81) 1.87 (1.35) -3.83 (3.25) 4.08 (2.59) 
   - New middle class 1.74 (0.96) 1.35 (0.79) -0.04 (0.92) -0.43 (1.31) -0.40 (0.94) 0.64 (2.28) 3.72 (1.60)* 
   - Never gainfully employed 3.19 (1.67)* 1.79 (1.35) 0.36 (1.29) -2.99 (1.58) -1.94 (1.10) -2.52 (3.16) 14.64 (2.56)*** 
   Union membership -0.15 (0.87) -0.05 (0.72) 0.18 (0.73) -1.28 (0.93) 0.26 (0.67) 0.25 (1.73) -0.46 (1.36) 
   Age (ref.: 18-39 years):        
   - 40-64 years 1.29 (0.85) 0.22 (0.70) -1.12 (0.77) 1.51 (0.93) -0.83 (0.72) 3.45 (1.81) -3.99 (1.49)** 
   - 65 years and older 3.75 (1.33)** 1.67 (1.12) -0.77 (1.10) 1.24 (1.29) -1.00 (0.97) -6.54 (2.58)** -5.86 (1.96)** 
   Gender: Male 1.55 (0.74)* 1.27 (0.62)* 1.17 (0.65) -2.33 (0.82)** -0.10 (0.56) 9.27 (1.51)*** -6.88 (1.16)*** 
   Region: East 2.11 (1.04)* 0.43 (0.77) -0.37 (0.79) 0.92 (1.10) 2.12 (0.85)** -3.88 (1.92)* -0.86 (1.38) 
AIC 1991.39 1297.51 1460.75 2378.57 1216.22 6214.73 4093.53 
BIC 2350.58 1616.07 1733.29 2599.74 1500.84 6440.35 4293.46 
Log Likelihood -939.97 -599.33 -688.09 -1154.97 -563.95 -3072.36 -2015.75 
Deviance explained 9.78 7.18 8.14 2.21 9.26 4.54 6.31 
Num. respondents 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 
Num. days 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Notes: For non-parametric terms entries are the effective degrees of freedom (EDF). The Figure displaying the non-parametric effect is indicated in parentheses for the main variable when the EDF 
is larger than one as smaller values indicate that the term gets penalized out of the model. For parametric terms entries are average marginal effects (AME) together with standard errors in parentheses.  
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table A 2: Agenda-Setting Effects, 2013 
 German federal election, 2013 
Level 2 
   Level 1 
International 
politics 
Law & domestic 
security 
Civil rights & 
liberties 
Immigration Social policy & 
social justice 
Seniors & 
retirement 
Employment Wages & work 
conditions 
Economic policy 
Non-parametric terms          
Perceived news content (28 lags) 1.00 (Fig.3) 0.00 (–) 4.00 (Fig.3)* 0.76 (Fig.3) 0.03 (Fig.3) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.60 (Fig.3) 0.49 (Fig.3) 
Time trend 0.00 (–) 1.85 (–)* 1.54 (–)** 1.06 (–)* 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.00 (–) 1.22 (–)* 0.00 (–) 
Random effect 15.45 (–)* 0.00 (–) 5.33 (–) 16.24 (–)* 1.16 (–) 0.00 (–) 0.02 (–) 6.14 (–) 3.08 (–) 
          
Parametric terms          
Perceived ad content: Yes (means) -4.75 (12.49) -0.00 (0.00) 6.67 (6.89) -29.22 (24.17) -4.01 (4.06) 3.47 (3.38) -3.46 (10.26) 9.32 (4.49)* -1.37 (2.76) 
Perceived ad content: Not asked 1.38 (1.58) 0.00 (0.00) 0.71 (0.94) 3.98 (1.84)* 0.11 (0.81) -0.40 (0.61) 3.69 (1.94) -0.62 (0.63) 0.11 (0.55) 
   Perceived ad content: Yes -5.60 (1.93)** 0.09 (1.08) 0.74 (2.75) 1.20 (2.53) -6.52 (3.54) -3.83 (2.33) 5.78 (3.75) 7.49 (3.77)* 1.38 (3.33) 
   Public TV news use -0.75 (0.75) -0.31 (0.47) 1.34 (1.00) -0.44 (0.86) -0.71 (1.13) 0.97 (0.78) -0.54 (1.21) 1.12 (1.03) -0.15 (0.92) 
   Private TV news use -0.29 (1.22) -0.50 (0.90) -2.22 (1.65) 0.96 (1.26) -2.73 (2.13) 2.12 (1.25) 5.21 (2.00)** 2.70 (1.56) -1.04 (1.93) 
   Quality newspaper use -2.03 (1.97) 0.27 (1.19) 0.76 (1.56) -5.09 (2.58) 0.72 (2.69) 0.10 (2.09) 4.77 (2.96) -3.51 (2.68) -0.65 (2.21) 
   Tabloid newspaper use -0.91 (2.15) -0.96 (1.61) -0.98 (2.56) 6.25 (1.86)*** -0.83 (3.62) 3.23 (2.06) -0.98 (3.54) -1.99 (2.80) -0.56 (3.95) 
   Local newspaper use -1.39 (1.06) -0.01 (0.69) -2.99 (1.34)* -2.41 (1.73) 0.67 (1.69) -0.07 (1.13) -1.50 (1.75) -2.83 (1.62) 0.28 (2.17) 
   Online news use 1.40 (1.23) -1.88 (1.00) 2.37 (1.82) 1.19 (1.86) 3.42 (1.95) -3.54 (1.53)* -6.72 (2.17)** -2.27 (2.15) 3.25 (2.04) 
   Political conversations 1.49 (1.42) 0.06 (1.07) 0.83 (1.48) 1.28 (1.73) 2.03 (2.43) 1.38 (1.73) -2.18 (2.70) 4.95 (1.99)* 0.64 (2.11) 
   Political interest -2.38 (1.88) 1.75 (1.33) 1.01 (1.91) -4.68 (2.21)* 7.81 (3.11)* -3.00 (2.17) -10.49 (3.21)*** 1.34 (2.61) 6.35 (2.61)* 
   Education (ref.: Low):          
   - Medium -1.71 (1.19) 0.18 (0.76) 0.36 (1.09) 1.59 (1.33) -1.46 (1.95) -2.91 (1.46)* 1.68 (2.02) -0.26 (1.59) 6.31 (1.44)*** 
   - High -1.11 (1.26) 0.11 (0.82) 2.53 (1.16)* -2.65 (1.24)* -1.11 (2.04) -4.10 (1.44)** -2.09 (2.06) -0.89 (1.65) 6.43 (1.42)*** 
   Party ID (ref.: None):          
   - CDU/CSU 2.45 (1.10)* 0.55 (0.70) -1.36 (0.98) 0.47 (1.20) -5.20 (1.61)** 1.96 (1.18) 4.40 (1.73)* -2.45 (1.33) 2.45 (1.42) 
   - SPD -0.21 (0.98) 0.12 (0.73) -0.44 (1.02) -1.17 (1.23) 5.38 (1.80)** 1.60 (1.16) 1.37 (1.77) 2.83 (1.52) -1.29 (1.37) 
   - FDP 0.53 (2.98) 0.47 (2.28) 4.40 (3.07) 1.61 (3.56) -4.02 (4.10) 0.77 (3.25) -2.64 (4.71) -5.32 (3.17) 1.01 (3.38) 
   - Greens -0.59 (1.36) -0.20 (1.02) 1.57 (1.42) -3.23 (1.57) 6.66 (2.52)** 1.18 (1.73) -4.29 (2.41) -0.68 (1.95) -0.88 (1.81) 
   - Left party 2.01 (2.02) 0.65 (1.41) -1.45 (1.70) 0.84 (2.32) 3.81 (3.26) 1.08 (2.38) 4.73 (3.34) 6.72 (2.95)* -4.29 (2.37) 
   - Other party -2.10 (2.79) 4.07 (4.41) 8.86 (4.32)** 2.88 (4.54) -0.77 (5.36) 6.22 (4.52) -9.00 (4.97) -1.68 (4.27) -1.84 (4.08) 
   Religion (ref.: None/other):          
   - Catholic -2.22 (1.12) -0.09 (0.91) 0.55 (1.03) -1.45 (1.32) 1.20 (1.91) 0.27 (1.31) -0.46 (1.92) -1.35 (1.56) 2.35 (1.60) 
   - Protestant -0.46 (1.08) -0.28 (0.76) 2.11 (1.02)* -0.54 (1.26) 3.14 (1.64) 0.65 (1.19) 0.36 (1.80) -0.94 (1.41) 1.12 (1.41) 
   Church attendance 0.13 (1.29) 0.67 (0.95) -3.37 (1.26)** 1.20 (1.43) -2.90 (2.16) -1.54 (1.51) -0.31 (2.22) 0.50 (1.72) -0.31 (1.76) 
   Class (ref.: Old middle class):          
   - Worker -1.26 (1.81) 1.87 (1.30) -0.36 (1.89) -1.93 (1.81) -0.38 (2.75) 0.93 (1.89) 7.21 (2.77)** 8.04 (2.34)*** -4.81 (2.27)* 
   - New middle class -1.79 (1.33) 0.34 (0.81) -1.59 (1.19) -1.52 (1.39) 0.12 (1.94) 0.31 (1.44) 5.09 (1.94)* 3.92 (1.42)* -1.69 (1.63) 
   - Never gainfully employed -2.28 (1.93) 0.13 (1.52) -0.95 (1.76) 0.54 (2.59) -3.23 (3.18) 0.98 (2.31) 4.48 (3.32) 1.59 (2.40) -3.59 (2.58) 
   Union membership 2.28 (1.02)* -0.28 (0.65) 1.40 (0.99) -0.69 (1.07) -0.55 (1.53) -0.99 (1.05) 1.73 (1.65) 1.02 (1.23) -0.87 (1.29) 
   Age (ref.: 18-39 years):          
   - 40-64 years 0.44 (0.97) 0.54 (0.68) -2.07 (1.17) 4.08 (1.05)*** 7.54 (1.66)*** 1.32 (1.26) 4.70 (1.86)* -1.00 (1.51) 4.46 (1.36)** 
   - 65 years and older 4.23 (1.46)** 2.50 (1.02)* -3.94 (1.35)** 5.35 (1.40)*** 7.48 (2.17)*** 0.32 (1.54) 3.44 (2.30) -1.11 (1.88) 3.13 (1.74) 
   Gender: Male -1.42 (0.83) -0.08 (0.57) 0.77 (0.78) -2.00 (0.97)* -0.68 (1.34) 0.28 (0.94) -2.88 (1.37)* -1.07 (1.11) 4.68 (1.07)*** 
   Region: East 1.05 (1.01) 1.26 (0.76) -1.14 (0.84) 0.21 (1.13) 2.80 (1.64) -0.58 (1.14) 9.33 (1.72)*** 2.19 (1.40) -1.76 (1.33) 
AIC 1957.64 1007.65 1802.51 2456.68 4545.07 2564.11 4751.90 3315.58 3336.52 
BIC 2280.75 1206.89 2098.83 2792.26 4757.89 2761.93 4949.97 3599.72 3577.49 
Log Likelihood -928.17 -472.59 -854.80 -1175.74 -2239.17 -1251.04 -2344.90 -1613.25 -1630.49 
Deviance explained 7.06 5.21 11.72 6.08 2.96 3.88 4.36 4.66 3.96 
Num. respondents 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 
Num. days 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Notes: For non-parametric terms entries are the effective degrees of freedom (EDF). The Figure displaying the non-parametric effect is indicated in parentheses for the main variable when the EDF is larger than one as smaller values 
indicate that the term gets penalized out of the model. For parametric terms entries are average marginal effects (AME) together with standard errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 3: Outlet-specific agenda-setting effects 
Level 2 
   Level 1 
Defence policy 
(2009) 
Civil rights & liberties 
(2013) 
Non-parametric terms   
Perceived news content: Public TV news (28 lags) 0.00 (Fig.4) 3.00 (Fig.4)** 
Perceived news content: Private TV news (28 lags) 0.54 (Fig.4) 0.00 (Fig.4) 
Perceived news content: Quality newspaper (28 lags) 0.00 (Fig.4) 0.36 (Fig.4) 
Perceived news content: Tabloid newspaper (28 lags) 0.00 (Fig.4) 0.27 (Fig.4) 
Perceived news content: Local newspaper (28 lags) 4.00 (Fig.4) 0.03 (Fig.4) 
Perceived news content: Online news (28 lags) 0.00 (Fig.4) 1.01 (Fig.4)* 
Time trend 0.71 (–) 1.53 (–)*** 
Random effect 16.66 (–)* 9.33 (–) 
   
Parametric terms   
Perceived ad content: Yes (means) 22.76 (8.90)** 4.65 (7.26) 
Perceived ad content: Not asked 0.34 (0.80) 0.89 (0.93) 
   Perceived ad content: Yes 2.85 (3.82) -0.73 (2.97) 
   Public TV news use -0.19 (0.64) -2.47 (1.58) 
   Private TV news use -1.09 (2.09) -1.78 (1.55) 
   Quality newspaper use 1.40 (1.54) 2.52 (1.84) 
   Tabloid newspaper use 1.62 (1.64) -1.95 (3.31) 
   Local newspaper use -2.50 (4.45) -1.95 (1.45) 
   Online news use -1.13 (1.46) 9.38 (2.96)** 
   Political conversations 0.34 (1.25) 0.84 (1.46) 
   Political interest 0.04 (1.67) 1.11 (1.92) 
   Education (ref.: Low):   
   - Medium -0.22 (1.04) 0.46 (1.08) 
   - High 0.15 (1.14) 2.64 (1.12)* 
   Party ID (ref.: None):   
   - CDU/CSU -0.73 (1.00) -1.29 (0.98) 
   - SPD -0.32 (1.00) -0.42 (1.02) 
   - FDP -1.88 (1.45) 4.93 (3.05) 
   - Greens 1.09 (1.48) 1.63 (1.41) 
   - Left party 6.98 (2.45)*** -1.40 (1.74) 
   - Other party 3.98 (4.17) 9.00 (4.11)** 
   Religion (ref.: None/other):   
   - Catholic 1.48 (1.31) 0.62 (1.06) 
   - Protestant 0.88 (1.12) 2.00 (0.98)* 
   Church attendance -1.97 (1.48) -3.51 (1.27)** 
   Class (ref: Old middle class):   
   - Worker 3.05 (1.60)* -0.19 (1.99) 
   - New middle class 1.77 (1.00) -1.59 (1.24) 
   - Never gainfully employed 3.20 (1.66)* -1.07 (1.74) 
   Union membership -0.22 (0.88) 1.50 (0.98) 
   Age (ref.: 18-39 years):   
   - 40-64 years 1.25 (0.84) -2.31 (1.16)* 
   - 65 years and older 3.80 (1.39)** -4.17 (1.33)** 
   Gender: Male 1.57 (0.76)* 0.79 (0.83) 
   Region: East 2.07 (1.09)* -1.25 (0.86) 
AIC 1992.33 1801.16 
BIC 2364.47 2152.31 
Log Likelihood -938.43 -845.54 
Deviance explained 9.93 12.68 
Num. obs. 4655 4356 
Num. days 55 55 
Notes: For non-parametric terms entries are the effective degrees of freedom (EDF). The Figure displaying the non-parametric effect is 
indicated in parentheses for the main variable when the EDF is larger than one as smaller values indicate that the term gets penalized 
out of the model. For parametric terms entries are average marginal effects (AME) together with standard errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
